



TLVMUN 2021

15 - 20 August 2021 • Tel Aviv

University



UN SECURITY COUNCIL

**Topic A: The Continental Shelf Dispute in the
Eastern Mediterranean**

Topic B: G5 Sahel- Preventing terrorism

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Letter of Welcome

Dear delegates,


we would like to welcome you to the TLVMUN 2021 Conference and to the Security Council! As we are to spend a few days together, we would like to briefly introduce ourselves.

* introductions *

As the advanced committee, on one hand, we expect you to work hard and be prepared on the academic level. On the other hand, we firmly believe in the act of trying too. Every delegate has his/her own style of engagement in debates, some prefer being highly active during formal proceedings, others pursue their interests in unmoderated caucuses or lobbies. We as chairs will ensure that every delegate is heard, respected and able to properly represent his/her country.

As in real life, the committee comprises both like-minded delegates and opponents. During the proceedings and negotiations, you will need to recognize your allies, rivals, or undecided delegates, which might be persuaded to support your positions. In addition, do not forget that you represent your country and not your opinion.

This study guide was designed to give you an insight into the topic discussed. Nevertheless, it is of critical importance to emphasize that it serves as a basis, which you will need to complement with your own research and consequently stance.



Although more research does not always equal more success in committee proceedings, we have one advice to give you - know your committee. In your research, dedicate some time for other members of the committee in order to presume and adapt more quickly to the dynamics, giving you an advantage in shaping the debate and ability to steer discussions in your favor.

"If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles."
- Sun Tzu

However, do not forget that the United Nations (UN) is an international organization that depends primarily on the cooperation and the goodwill of its 193 Member States. Therefore, despite different views on the issue, try to negotiate, find openings, include others and engage in debates in the spirit of the United Nations.

The selected topics for the Security Council are both complex and interesting as well as gaining more international attention. We hope to ignite discussions, heated debates and exciting negotiations that will help to shape the world into what we know today.

See you in the committee!




The Committee

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the United Nations' six main organs, originally established by the United Nations Charter. It was established, like the UN as whole, following World War II. As per the Charter, the UNSC is primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security, in accordance with the general principles of the United Nations (UN Charter, Article 24).

The UNSC consists of 15 members – five permanent members, and 10 members that are elected by the UN General Assembly for a two-year term (UN Charter, Article 23). The permanent members are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the USA. The non-permanent members are chosen based on geographical distribution and their contribution to international peace and security efforts (ibid.). Once the term of a non-permanent member is over, this member cannot be immediately reelected.

Each member of the Council has one vote (UN Charter, Article 27). Procedural votes can be passed with nine affirmative votes, any other matter also passes with nine votes, provided that all five permanent members concur (ibid.). This means that the permanent members have a special status within the UNSC. If one of them vetoes a non-procedural decision, the decision does not pass, regardless of how many yes-votes it received. The same does not apply for abstention. On decisions about a dispute, if the parties to the dispute are members of the UNSC, they shall abstain from voting (ibid.).

The UNSC has a number of functions and powers. It is tasked with maintaining international peace and security, investigating situations that may lead to international tension or dispute, recommending solution to said situations, formulating plans to regulate armament, imposing sanctions upon breaches of peace or acts of aggression, or even taking military action to restore international peace and security (UN Charter, Articles 24, 26, 33, 34, 36, 41, 42). The UNSC may also refer cases to the International



Criminal Court (ICC), even in situations that the ICC would otherwise not have jurisdiction over. While UNSC recommendations are non-binding and have no means of enforcement, actions under “Chapter VII” (ie economic sanctions, and the use of force) are binding. This makes the UNSC the only body able to issue binding resolutions (Fasulo 2004, 39).


Topic A: The Continental Shelf Dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean

INTRODUCTION

The Eastern Mediterranean Sea has historically been a geographic area of supreme geopolitical value as it is the sea that unites, or separates depending on one’s perspective, three continents; Europe, Asia and Africa. This remains the case today, but its importance has been enhanced by an additional factor, the discovery of large natural gas reserves in its continental shelf.

The already delicate relationships of regional powers in the area such as Turkey, Greece, Egypt, Libya, Cyprus and Israel became much more complicated as different countries made overlapping claims on the same areas and their historical and ongoing rivalries made resolving the issues through dialogue almost an impossibility.

Tensions came to a head in the summer of 2020 when following Turkey’s conduct of exploration missions in an area between Crete and Cyprus lead to a collision of one of its frigates with a Greek one that was patrolling the same waters, tasked to prevent such research from ever taking place. Belligerent statements were made and P5 members such as France and the United States sent their navies to the area, accelerating the geopolitical tensions at play.




A year later, the balance is as delicate as ever, with none of the major or minor disputes having been resolved. At the same time, across the world, a similar dispute over eliminations of exclusive economic zones is playing out in the South China Sea, so the outcome in the Eastern Mediterranean would create a significant *fait-accompli* on that dispute as well.

It is thus up to the United Nations Security Council within its mandate as the guarantor of international peace and security to find a solution that would successfully de-escalate the conflict and prevent it from developing into a major threat for international security. It is thus up to the delegates of this conference to use their diplomatic and rhetorical skills that achieve a lasting solution, whose consequences also protect the delegate's national interests.

The purpose of this guide is to serve as a starting point for the delegate's research into the topic, not a complete analysis of it, as that would require far more space. As such, some very nuanced issues of international law and the complex history of the region have been necessarily streamlined. Delegates are welcomed and encouraged to go beyond this guide to form very informed arguments and the *Further Reading* section of the guide will direct them to sources to do so.

KEY TERMS

In this section a few key terms of international law will be explained as they are necessary to understanding the conflict at hand. The terms are explained simply in the main text , with some additional relevant information for each term and there is also a footnote with the corresponding exact definition from *The Encyclopedic Dictionary of International Law*.



Territorial Waters/ Sea¹: This term denotes a sea area that is adjacent to the territory of a state and in which the state is fully sovereign, as if it was a land within its borders. It typically extends to 12 nautical miles from the shores of the state, as that is the limit agreed to in the UN Convention on the Sea (UNCLOS).


Continental Shelf²: This term denotes the physical natural extent of a coastal state's lands that continues at the bottom of the sea past one's territorial waters. Its legal definition can be found in Article 76(1) of UNCLOS)

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ):³ The Exclusive Economic Zone of a state is the area of water over which a state has exclusive sovereign rights to exploit for financial gain. It is typically exactly equal to a state's Continental Shelf, but it is a more expansive term as it also includes the entire body of water above the sea-bed (thus including fishing).

¹ Territorial sea: It had long been recognized in international law that a coastal State has sovereignty over a belt of water adjacent to its coast, generally termed the territorial sea or territorial waters p.598

² "[t]he continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines [of the territorial sea] where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance" p.122

³ "The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a concept developed at the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea 1974–1982, and was intended to accord to every coastal State exclusive jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of the seabed, subsoil, and superjacent waters adjacent to its coast to a maximum of 200 miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. See arts. 55–75 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982: 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. In relation to the continental shelf, the zone may extend beyond 200 miles to the outer edge of the continental margin, and a complicated set of formulae has been devised in art. 76 to determine the outer edge of the continental margin. " p.203



It is a very different concept from that of the territorial Sea. In the territorial sea, a nation is fully *sovereign* whereas within the EEZ, the coastal state merely has *sovereign rights* to economic exploitation. In other words, the territorial sea is within a nation's borders whereas the EEZ can be conceptualised as a much, much wider area that is outside one's borders and (in closed seas such as the Mediterranean) it effectively stops where another states' EEZ begins.


In order for a state to demarcate their EEZ, there would have to be an agreement with any other state that has directly opposite or adjacent coastlines. This agreement can be either a result of diplomatic negotiations or a decision by an international court with jurisdiction over the issue. However, crucially, a state cannot unilaterally demarcate their EEZ over a disputed territory.

In addition, if an EEZ has not been lawfully demarcated, a state does not have a right to conduct any research on the continental shelf of the area, as it is still considered disputed and such an action would be violating the sovereign rights of other states that are disputing the same area.

Law of the Sea: The Law of the sea refers to the body of principles and rules of international law that are applicable to the concepts above. It is distinct from Maritime Law, Shipping Law and Admiralty Law which deals with the commercial and juridical aspects of shipping.

It is codified in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Because this convention is so widely adopted, it is now considered as part of International Customary Law⁴, thus binding all states, even if they have not signed and ratified the convention. The only coastal states that have neither acceded to nor signed the Convention are: Eritrea, Israel, Peru, Syria, Turkey and Venezuela.

⁴ See Lee, Martin (2006) *The Interrelation Between the Law of the Sea Convention and Customary International Law*



Thus, there are two key players in the region that are not part of the Treaty. Israel has not signed UNCLOS because it objected to the mandatory jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which it does not consider an impartial court. However, Israel has demarcated its EEZ through Agreement with Cyprus⁵.

Turkey's disagreements with UNCLOS are much more fundamental and are one of the key reasons for the existence of the Eastern Mediterranean Dispute. It holds, *inter alia*, that the Convention is fundamentally unfair as it fails to recognise a 'special regime' for the influence of islands in delimitating the continental shelf (and thus the EEZ) when it comes to 'closed seas' as well as not severely limiting the continental shelf of islands when they are placed on the 'wrong side' of the middle line between the mainlands of two states with opposite coastlines⁶.

DIMENSIONS OF THE TOPIC

This section forms the most major part of the study guide and is split into five smaller subsections that illuminate another aspect of the dispute. They are

- i. The Greek-Turkish Rivalry in the Aegean
- ii. The "Cyprus Issue"
- iii. The Overall Geopolitical Picture
- iv. The Libya Factor
- v. The August 2020 Crisis

⁵<https://www.iene.eu/stormy-waters-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-p5500.html>

⁶ Yolga, N (1995) *Question de la limitation du plates continental de la mer Égée*



i. The Greek-Turkish rivalry in the Aegean

In order to discuss the maritime dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean at large, it is necessary to briefly talk about the issues between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean as their fundamental coordinates have been transposed from that sea to the wider Eastern Med region.

The Aegean Sea is a semi-closed sea between Greece and Turkey which contains hundreds of populated islands that belong to Greece, extending all the way to less than 2 miles opposite the coasts of Turkey. This has led to a unique situation whereby if populated islands were given full influence in delimitating it would result in Turkey being effectively 'landlocked' in terms of economic rights in the sea.

Although this is a maximalist position that no international court would uphold, it is the starting negotiating position of Greece, from which it would negotiate down. To counter this, Turkey has adopted the opposite extreme, arguing that negotiations should start at a median line between the two mainlands, this giving no continental shelf to major populated islands, something that goes directly against international law.

The same disagreement over the influence of islands in EEZ demarcations applies to the Eastern Mediterranean, where the Greek island of Megisti/ Kastelorizo, that is only 1 mile off of the Turkish Coast and over 500 miles from the Greek mainland with only about 100 inhabitants would generate over 40,000 square kilometres of EEZ if it was given full influence, effectively shutting Turkey out of the Eastern Mediterranean and would mean that the the EEZ's of Cyprus and Greece would 'touch' (see Figure 1 below).

While Figure 1 shows the maximalist demarcation lines of both sides. What is notable is that the Turkish claims reduce not only tiny Kastellorizo to having no EEZ, but also very large islands such as Rhodes, Carpathos and Crete, the latter of which is the fourth largest island in the entire Mediterranean. So such a claim is very profoundly violating the sovereign rights of





Figure 1: The blue line denotes the Greek EEZ and Cypriot EEZ claims whereas the Red line denotes the Turkish EEZ Claims (Licence: Wikipedia)

Greece and customary international law. At the same time, the Greek maximalist claim allows Greece, through Kastellorizo to border Cyprus, thus effectively 'encircling' Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean despite it having by far the largest coastline in the area. It is clear to all observers that an answer that respects both International Law and equity lies somewhere in the middle, but getting the two sides to negotiate in good faith has proved almost impossible. This is due to other outstanding issues between the two nations. They are, *inter alia*, the demilitarised status of certain islands in the Aegean, the issue of sovereignty 'grey zones' at the maritime border in the Eastern Aegean, the delimitation of national airspace and the Turkey's officially stated *casus belli* against Greece, should the latter extend its territorial seas from 6 to 12 nautical miles as it has the right to do so under the UNCLOS. The main difference between these disputes and the one about the EEZ is that Greece only recognises the latter as a legitimate dispute, considering the rest to be non-issues that are resolved under the current treaties and not up for negotiation (ref).

However, since Greece only recognises one dispute, whereas Turkey sees several, it is very difficult to enter negotiations as Greece would only accept one item in the agenda, that of the



EEZ demarcation. Similarly, should the case be referred to the International Court of Justice, they would first have to reach an agreement on the specific issues the Court would decide on and thus the same impasse is reached⁷.

ii. The “Cyprus Issue”

Another aspect of the Eastern Mediterranean dispute is the perennial ‘Cyprus issue’, which became even more intractable as large natural gas reserves were found in the sea of Cyprus in 2014.


Since the 1974 Turkish invasion, the island remains split between the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus (the Republic) in the South that is the official government of the island and the self-declared ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) in the North which is recognised only by Turkey, who also does not recognise the Republic as the legitimate government of the island, referring to it instead as the ‘Greek-Cypriot Administration’.

Since the 1980’s every UN Secretary General has mediated efforts to reunify the island as a bi-communal federation, no one has succeeded thus far. The two sides came close with the Annan Plan in 2004, which was endorsed by both Turkey and Greece. However, while the North accepted the UN-sponsored plan, it was defeated in the south in a referendum by a huge margin. Following the plan’s failure, the Republic accented to the European Union in 2004 without resolving the issue.

The discovery of gas reserves was thought to bring the two sides much closer to a solution⁸ as common exploitation of these reserves would incentivise the reunification of the island.

⁷ Kaklikis, G (2020) *Greek-Turkish relations: the dialogue, the exploratory talks, the ICJ* : Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

⁸ Wilson, R (2014) *Turks, Cypriots and the Cyprus Problem: Hopes and Complications*



However, they have proved to have made it even more difficult, greatly complicating the wider Eastern Mediterranean dispute in the process.

The Republic has held the position that as the only officially recognised government of the land it is entitled to a continental shelf, an EEZ and therefore to develop the gas reserves. This is presented as an non-negotiable right that is independent from the solution of the 'Issue'⁹. However, Turkey and the TRNC's position is that there cannot be exploitation of the gas reserves unilaterally by the Republic, as that would violate the rights of Turkish Cypriots. It additionally holds that the Greek Cypriots have usurped the title of the 'Republic of Cyprus' and thus are an illegitimate government. Therefore, any international agreement Cyprus makes vis-a-vis its continental shelf is null and void in the eyes of Turkey.

Turkey has repeatedly threatened to take "all necessary measures" to protect its rights in the Eastern Mediterranean and has acted on those statements, repeatedly sending its navy to patrol areas that are within the Cypriot EEZ, thus intimidating the much weaker country from proceeding with developing the reserves. Despite that, Cyprus has already licensed different blocks of its EEZ to international companies such as the French Total and the American Exxon-Mobil. Thus, these two P5 powers become indirectly involved in the dispute since they have an incentive to protect their investment.

Figure 2 shows the overlapping claims between the internationally illegitimate TRNC and the Republic of Cyprus in the South of the island. Cyprus' natural gas reserves are estimated to be the fourth largest globally behind Russia, Iran, Turkmenistan and Qatar¹⁰. Thus the economic stakes for exploiting them are tremendous. But, as the sea surrounding Cyprus is very deep,

⁹ Gürel & Tziimitras (2015) *CaGas can become a new lost opportunity*

¹⁰ <https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Cyprus/Gas-in-Cyprus-blessing-or-curse-191948>

the cost of exploitation is also very high, making it a risky investment whose profitability hinges on global demand as much as it does on the geopolitics of the area.

Since Cyprus demarcated its EEZ with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010) Turkey believes again that it constitutes an encirclement of its own southern flank and its repeated incursions on Cyprus's EEZ is aimed at undermining such a status quo. Cyprus' allies such as




Figure 2: Map of maritime boundaries and exploration blocks in the Eastern Mediterranean (Source: Oxford

Greece, Israel and France denounce this behaviour as a blatant violation of international law but no actions have been taken.



iii. The Overall geopolitical picture

The overall geopolitical dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean are also fanning the flames of the conflict, as new alliances are forming and interests are realigning. In the last decade Israel emerged as a major player in the region, following its own natural gas discoveries and its drastically improved relations with Egypt and the nations of the Gulf due to the diplomatic space created by the Arab Spring. At the same time, Turkey found itself betting on the wrong people as its support for Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt proved a major misstep when that government fell to be replaced by General Al-Sisi.

Greece seized this opportunity and went on an initiative to improve its relations with Tel-Aviv and Cairo, while Turkey's relationship with Israel was severely damaged following the Mavi Marmara episode in May of 2010. Thus, Israel looked to Greece as its main strategic partner in the region, especially in area of technology exchange and pilot training¹¹.

In 2020 the East Mediterranean Gas Forum was announced, an International Organisation formed by Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Italy and the Palestinian Authority, headquartered in Cairo, with France joining in March 2021. Its aim is to coordinate the construction of a pipeline, the 'EastMed' (see figure 3), which would transfer natural gas from Israel and Cyprus to the European Markets, thus bypassing Turkey and reducing Russian influence in the continent. Due to the latter, the United States has also shown tepid support for the project, especially as Exxon would be one of the main companies operating in these reserves.

¹¹ Corev, Spanier & Yanarokak (2020) *Stormy Waters in the Eastern Mediterranean* : Institute of Energy for South East Europe




Figure 3: The proposed East-Med pipeline (source: EuroActiv)

iv. The Libya Factor

Since 2011 Libya has been on an on-going civil war that by 2020 had been reduced to two major sides, the Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli that is the officially recognised government of Libya and controls the west of the country and the Libyan National Arab Army (LNA) lead by General Haftar, supported by the Libyan House of Representatives that controls the east including the oil fields around Benghazi.

In November 2019 Libya's GNA government and Turkey signed an EEZ agreement in addition to Turkey providing material support for the GNA in the civil war. This agreement was widely seen as prima-facie unlawful as Libya and Turkey do not have opposite coastlines and lines between them can only be drawn if the rights of large Greek islands such as Crete and Rhodes are completely disregarded. Naturally, Greece and Egypt declared the agreement null and void for violating their sovereign rights and so did the EU after Greece's lobbying.

However, the support of Turkey was enough for the embattled GNA forces to turn the tide on the civil war and halt Haftar's offensive. This angered France, which has been quietly supporting Haftar (although it denies doing so) and its companies have large investments in



the Benghazi fields. Additionally, France sees Haftar as a force against Islamist extremism and the area, which is important for French interests as it is actively fighting Islamists in Mali. In June 2020, a French frigate was harassed by Turkish naval vessels as it was trying to enforce the UN arms embargo¹² in Libya.

Thus, the tensions in terms of international security in the area were even further increased, as this was the first event of a really tense summer.

v. The August 2020 Crisis

Starting in July 2020, Turkey sent its research vessel Oruc Reis, accompanied by navy frigates, to conduct research in an area of the Eastern Mediterranean between Crete and Cyprus (see Figure 4) that is claimed by Greece. Such an action was aimed at creating *fait accompli* in the area, as Turkey also claims it as part of its EEZ. Thus, the Greek navy had to respond to deter such a research operation from ever taking place in violation of its sovereign rights, creating a crisis of international security.

On the 13th of August 2020, President Erdogan declared that any harassment of Oruc Reis would result in a “high price” to be paid and that Turkey is ready to defend itself. However Greece remained in the area following the Turkish ships and on August 10th 2020, the Greek Frigate Limnos collided with Turkish Frigate Kemal-Reis resulting in the latter being taken out of commission, an event that the Greek Navy leaked to its media¹³. Thus the crisis was accelerated as belligerent words were exchanged on both sides, both claiming to be ready to defend their rights.

In response, France supported Greece, with Macron stating that Turkey is violating the rights of Greece and Cyprus and it provided material support sending two frigates in the area.

¹²<https://www.economist.com/international/2020/08/20/a-row-between-turkey-and-greece-over-gas-is-raising-tension-in-the-eastern-mediterranean>

¹³ <https://www.ekathimerini.com/255987/article/ekathimerini/news/after-collision-athens-plans-next-steps>

Germany took a softer stance, offering mediation between the two sides but was greatly displeased by Greece as the latter announced an EEZ agreement with Egypt overlapping with the Turkish-Libya agreement, on the day before the talks were to take place (see Figure 4).





Figure 4: The overlapping EEZ Agreements and the Oruc Reis research

Erdogan in response to Macron claimed that “Turkey is strong enough to deter anyone who attempts to seize its rights by deploying an armada” and that “the period of determine their [French] imperialist understanding by drawing lines on maps is over”¹⁴. Macron replied that its actions were proportionate and they didn’t send an ‘armada’, in addition he reiterated that

¹⁴ <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkey-slams-frances-statement-on-east-med/1958164>



"I don't consider that in recent years Turkey's strategy is the strategy of a NATO ally ... when you have a country which attacks the exclusive economic zones or the sovereignty of two members of the European Union" ¹⁵.

In the following weeks, Turkey and Greece eased quietly decided to tensions through NATO bilateral talks but nothing was fundamentally solved, leaving the stage set for another crisis in the future. Thus it is up to the UN Security Council to find a lasting solution to prevent conflict erupting in the area...

BLOC POSITIONS

As this is the UN Security Council and not the General Assembly, we do not expect concrete blocs to be formed. As this is an advanced committee, delegates are expected to research their own country's position deeply in order to know where they stand on the issues and bring this knowledge to the final negotiated document.

The guide has already alluded to the interests of **France** and the **USA** as P5 members, but many other states in the Council will be impacted by the final resolution. Crucially, **Vietnam** and **China** should consider carefully on how any resolution in this matter affects their dispute in the South China Sea. Equally, **Norway** as a maritime power has a major interest in setting a favourable precedence vis-a-vis issues of the Law of the Sea.

Whether a resolution is produced, or negotiations break down due to intractable vetoes, delegates are judged first and foremost on whether they have acted responsibly as diplomats of their own state and as participants in the Security Council that has an institutional responsibility towards international peace and security for the entire globe.

¹⁵ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-macron-turkey-idUSKBN25O2OO>





POINTS A RESOLUTION SHOULD ANSWER/ POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

- What kind of security measures can the UNSC take to ensure that there is stability in the region?
 - Does the situation demand a Chapter VII intervention in the area?
- Should the sides be compelled to go to the International Court of Justice to decide on their differences?
- Is either Turkey or the Republic of Cyprus violating UN resolutions and International Law when it comes to rights of natural gas exploitation?
 - If so, should there be penalties?
- Has the UN embargo in Libya been violated?
 - If so, should there be penalties?
- Should the Libya-Turkey agreement be declared null and void by the Council ?
- Is there a role for international organisations such as NATO in this solution?
- What should be the role of the UNSC in maritime disputes looking into the future?
 - Is there room for institutional innovation, in order to prevent future conflicts elsewhere such as the South China Sea?

RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS (TO BE ADDED)

FURTHER READING

- <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkey-slams-frances-statement-on-east-med/1958164>
- <https://www.economist.com/international/2020/08/20/a-row-between-turkey-and-greece-over-gas-is-raising-tension-in-the-eastern-mediterranean>


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- <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/08/20/dealing-with-a-dangerous-dispute-in-the-eastern-med>
 - <https://www.eliamep.gr/en/publication/o-diálogos-oi-diereynητικές-η-χάγη/>
 - https://www.reddit.com/r/geopolitics/comments/cn487y/kastelorizo_a_9_sqkm_greek_island_that_can_decide/
 - <https://balkaneu.com/kastelorizo-the-focal-point-for-the-eez-in-the-aegean-and-eastern-mediterranean/>
 - <https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/gas-fields-and-tensions-in-the-eastern-mediterranean/>
 - <https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Cyprus/Gas-in-Cyprus-blessing-or-curse-191948>
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Topic B: G5 Sahel- Preventing terrorism

INTRODUCTION

The region of Sahel constitutes a 'transition realm' between the Sahara Desert in the north and sub-Saharan Africa in the south. From the political perspective, the region comprises primarily the states of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger; however, also others are geographically included. The main focus of this topic and guide is the group G5 Sahel, more specifically the alarming situation in Mali, which influences the entire region.


Figure 1: Member states of the G5 Sahel



source: Wikipedia (2021): *G5 Sahel*. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G5_Sahel (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).

The region suffers from harsh climate, weak governance, corruption, growing population, economic difficulties and other issues. Together, such environment produces favorable conditions for extremism and terrorism. The destabilizing nature of terrorist presence and activities, together with above mentioned unfavorable situation creates a vicious circle.

Terrorism in the region has been on the rise since early 2000s, with violent extremist organizations expanding their ambitions, capabilities and reach in the Sahel. Brutal terrorist



activities have claimed tens of thousands of innocent lives – for example, in 2014, Boko Haram killed 6,500 civilians and in 2015 11,000, which is more than the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq in the same period.¹⁶

Recently, terrorist organizations such as AQIM (*Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb*) and Boko Haram have come under increasing pressure, as a result of regional (e.g. France) and international pressure (United Nations). However, local conditions allow such organizations to remain internally intact (e.g. leadership) and recruit new members only to re-emerge.¹⁷ Therefore, the current fight against terrorism, a short-term solution for ‘symptoms’ have to be complemented with long-term solutions focused on causes, which would prevent subsequent deterioration. One of such solutions in the narrower area of security could be prevention.

Besides an essential need for current efforts to be expanded and made more sustainable, serious commitment and coordination by regional governments and international partners is of crucial importance.¹⁸ However, the affected nations of the G5 Sahel group cannot break the vicious circle themselves through self-help; therefore, the international community needs to decisively react.

In order to effectively address the issue, the Security Council needs to set aside its differences and send an ambitious signal about the commitment of the international community to resolve the situation, save human lives and improve regional living conditions. Effective cooperation with G5 Sahel countries could also spark similar processes in other regions through a positive spill-over effect.

¹⁶ Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2016): *Militancy and the Arc of Instability: Violent extremism in the Sahel*. Available at: http://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160922_Sanderson_MilitancyArcInstabilitySahel_Web.pdf (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.



HISTORY OF THE TOPIC

The most recent major cause of the current situation could be identified as the 2011-2012 Tuareg rebellion in the north of Mali. The rebels, encompassing Tuaregs, AQIM, or deserted Malian soldiers, were well-equipped combatants returning from Libya in the wake of the fall of the regime there. The armed groups defeated government forces in the north and the entire situation resulted in a military coup d'état.¹⁹ The instability persists to this day, creating conditions favorable to terrorists and their ambitions.

The issue of terrorism in Sahel has seen a growing attention to its importance in recent years, mainly due to the deteriorating situation. The most recent major event happened in 2013 with serious victories of AQIM against the Malian military. At the request of Mali, France intervened (Operation Serval) and prevented AQIM from conquering the capital Bamako.²⁰ Together with the joint French and Malian offensive north, deployment of African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) was accelerated.²¹ Later in 2013, pursuant to the Security Council resolution S/RES/2100 (2013), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established and took over from the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM), established in 2012, and AFISMA.²²

In 2015, the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Resulting from the Algiers Process was signed between the Malian authorities and armed groups. However, the agreement has failed to deliver its promises, as it focuses on the 2011-2012 separatist rebellion and fails to

¹⁹ United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (n.d.): *History*. Available at: <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/history> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).

²⁰ BBC News (2021): *West Africa's Islamist insurgency: Fight at a critical stage*. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57324672> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).

²¹ United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (n.d.): *History*. Available at: <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/history> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).

²² Ibid.



address the mentioned subsequent issues, such as Islamist violence, lethal ethnic tensions, and persistent insecurity.²³

Despite military successes and significant improvement of the security situation, several challenges, such as terrorist attacks, weapons proliferation, drug smuggling and other related criminal activities, remain topical and are likely to continue to undermine governance and development.²⁴

Moreover, since the international intervention, the situation has been worsening. The number of attacks, as well as people joining terrorist organizations, has increased. The cause is partly in violations of human rights, including killings and arrests based on ethnicity, by security forces.²⁵

G5 Sahel

As affected countries cannot resolve the situation individually, the attempt to coordinate, cooperate and pool their resources in order to break from the vicious circle and set a path in the right direction. One of the outcomes of such processes is a framework for cooperation between Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger – the G5 Sahel group.

The G5 Sahel is an intergovernmental cooperation framework established in 2014 at the initiative of the Mauritanian Presidency of the African Union. The framework broadly aims to fight insecurity and support development.²⁶


In 2017, the cooperation advanced to the creation of the Cross-Border Joint Force (CBJF). This force has three main objectives: fight against terrorism, cross-border organized crime and

²³ Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2020): *Why Mali needs a new peace deal*. Available at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-mali-needs-new-peace-deal> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ministère de L'Europe et des Affaires Étrangères (2020): *G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance*. Available at: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/crises-and-conflicts/g5-sahel-joint-force-and-the-sahel-alliance/> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).



human trafficking in the G5 Sahel zone.²⁷ In 2019, the first group of officers was jointly trained in operations and academics by the G5 Sahel Collège de Défense. Overall, CBJF does not aim to replace, but rather complement, the operations of MINUSMA. Under the Security Council resolution S/RES/2391 (2017)²⁸ MINUSMA provides *inter alia* operational and logistical support to the CBJF.²⁹

Apart from the military dimension, G5 Sahel have also engaged in supporting development (response to shared crises, infrastructure, access to resources, governance, emergency stabilization, etc.) through the Priority Investment Programme (*PIP*).³⁰ Moreover, in 2017, the Sahel Alliance was launched by France, Germany and the European Union – quickly joined by other major actors, such as national development agencies of developed states, the World Bank Group, or the African Union among others. Overall, the Sahel Alliance brings together the main multilateral and bilateral development partners of Sahel States. The objective is to speed up aid deployment and ensure it is better targeted and not spread too thinly, especially in the most vulnerable areas. The key priorities are youth employability, education and training; agriculture, rural development and food security; energy and climate; governance; decentralization and support for rolling out basic services; and internal security.³¹

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ United Nations Security Council (2021): *Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General*. Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2021_442.pdf (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).

²⁹ Ministère de L'Europe et des Affaires Étrangères (2020): *G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance*. Available at: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/crises-and-conflicts/g5-sahel-joint-force-and-the-sahel-alliance/> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ The Sahel Alliance (n.d.): *The Sahel Alliance*. Available at: <https://www.alliance-sahel.org/en/sahel-alliance/> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).



DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM

Terrorist groups destabilise the Sahel and fuel intercommunal violence. Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province remain a threat to north-eastern Nigeria and to other countries in the Lake Chad Basin, whereas AQIM continues to operate in Central and Northern Mali. Furthermore, in recent months, controversial presidential elections triggered political violence in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea. In addition, the United Nations raised new warnings about food insecurity and the risk of famine in north-eastern Nigeria, Yemen, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which are subject to discussions in the Security Council.³²

Specifically, **Nigeria** suffers from worsening banditry violence in the north (over 1,100 people killed in the first half of 2020). Moreover, nationwide protests against police brutality turned violent on 20th October 2020 when soldiers fired at demonstrators in Lagos, killing at least a dozen people; this triggered looting and the burning of police stations and government buildings across Nigeria.³³

Violent extremist groups continue an insurgency in **Burkina Faso** marked by human rights violations by terrorist groups as well as by security forces and self-defence militias that has resulted in the internal displacement of over one million people. United Nations officials are also stressing the alarming crisis levels of food insecurity (with some northern local areas with famine), which now affects 3.3 million people. The conflict-induced hunger poses one of the major challenges in the region.³⁴


Niger continues to be destabilized by spill-over violence from Mali and Burkina Faso.

In **Guinea** and **Côte d'Ivoire**, incumbent presidents ran for controversial third terms. Post-electoral violence with occasional ethnic undertones caused numerous deaths and arrests

³² Security Council Report (2020): *January 2021 Monthly Forecast: West Africa and the Sahel*. Available at: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2021-01/west-africa-and-the-sahel-5.php> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.



amid a crackdown on opposition protests. Almost 22,000 people had fled to neighboring countries amid the political tensions (more than 20,000 to Liberia). Corruption and dire political situation continue to undermine efforts against terrorism.³⁵

From the abovementioned it is clear, that the threat of terrorism remains a key issue. The Security Council should during this meeting focus more on the long-term solutions – the prevention of terrorism, which is a highly complex issue, where only unwavering and continuous efforts produce a successful outcome. That is the reason why it is so difficult.

One of key aspects could be the role of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS). UNOWAS has the responsibility for preventive diplomacy, good offices and political mediation and facilitation efforts in West Africa and the Sahel. It in addition works to consolidate peace and democratic governance in countries emerging from conflict or political crises and its support is of great importance to post-conflict countries where peace operations have withdrawn (e.g. UNIOGBIS in Guinea-Bissau).³⁶

UNOWAS works closely with regional and multilateral partners, such as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the G5 Sahel group, as well as other regional partners to support regional solutions to cross-cutting threats to peace and security, such as terrorism and violent extremism, transnational organized crime (e.g. drug trafficking), piracy and maritime insecurity.³⁷


Moreover, UNOWAS assists regional institutions and member states to enhance their capacities to promote good governance and respect for the rule of law, human rights and the mainstreaming of gender in conflict prevention.³⁸

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (n.d.): *Background*. Available at: <https://unowas.unmissions.org/background> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).

³⁸ Ibid.



More specifically, UNOWAS also leads the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (*UNISS*), established pursuant to the Security Council resolution S/RES/2056 (2013).³⁹

UNISS was created in 2013, however in 2018, it received a greater effect through operationalization of the United Nations Sahel Support Plan (*UNSP*), which aims to promote coherence and coordination within the UNISS framework. UNISS focuses on support in three main areas:⁴⁰

- 1) Governance;
- 2) Resilience;
- 3) Security.

The abovementioned UNSP emphasizes 6 priority areas:

- 1) Cross-border cooperation;
- 2) Prevention and sustaining peace;
- 3) Economic revitalization and inclusive growth;
- 4) Climate action;
- 5) Renewable energy;
- 6) Women and youth empowerment.


UNISS and UNSP attempts to address the root causes of human insecurity and development challenges through the above-mentioned areas, whereas crisis prevention and resilience stand at the core of these efforts.⁴¹ Moreover, the UN system collaboration is supported and enhanced, along with promoting coherent international responses. Furthermore, the United Nations has been seeking to further strengthen cooperation with regional organisations.⁴² Consequently, UNOWAS is the central body for UN prevention efforts in the region. Whereas MINUSMA focuses more on the short-term solutions and ‘hard’ security, UNOWAS

³⁹ The United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (n.d.): *Mission and Objective*. Available at: <https://unis-sahel.org/uniss-2/> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (n.d.): *Background*. Available at: <https://unowas.unmissions.org/background> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).



complements its efforts with long-term focus on areas, which affects the situation more indirectly.

Implementation of Mali's 2015 peace agreement is also frequently cited as key for the Sahel's stabilization. UNOWAS supports such efforts complementary to those of MINUSMA (see section 6. Previous UN Involvement).

To summarize, there is not a single root cause of terrorism in Sahel, but rather numerous factors intertwined and mutually influential. The main causes of the instability and terrorism, and therefore the main areas of focus and emphasis, are climate conditions, food security, inclusive economic prosperity, education, governance, energy, cross-border cooperation, reconciliation between ethnicities, corruption and others.

As this section focused more on the 'soft' security and a more indirect approach characteristic to prevention, the following section attempts to provide a brief overview of UN involvement from a more 'hard' security point of view, in order to create a coherent and complete image of the situation.


PREVIOUS UN INVOLVEMENT

As briefly introduced above, the United Nations and more specifically the Security Council, have been actively engaged in the issues of Sahel. The Security Council has adopted several resolutions and received numerous Secretary-General's reports.

Pursuant to the Security Council resolution S/RES/2085 (2012), the UNOM was established and deployment of AFISMA was authorized. However, as soon as in 2013 and pursuant to the resolution S/RES/2100 (2013)⁴³, UNOM was subsumed into and the authority over AFISMA was taken over by MINUSMA, which remains the basis for UN efforts in the region.⁴⁴

⁴³ United Nations Security Council (2013): *S/RES/2100 (2013)*. Available at: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2100\(2013\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2100(2013)) (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).

⁴⁴ United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (n.d.): *History*. Available at: <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/history> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).



The mandate of MINUSMA is subject to a periodic renewal by the Security Council. The current mandate established by resolution S/RES/2531 (2020) will expire, unless extended, on 30 June 2021. The mandate consists of two strategic priorities:⁴⁵

- 1) support of the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali by the Malian parties and other relevant Malian actors;
- 2) facilitate the implementation by Malian actors of a comprehensive politically-led strategy to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence and re-establish State authority, State presence and basic social services in Central Mali.

The persistent delays and lack of improvement resulted in a more 'direct' approach by the Security Council – it expects to see progress made and measures adopted in areas such as implementation of the 2015 agreement, constitutional reform, decentralization, reforms of the security sector, development of the North and full, effective and meaningful participation of women. To express its seriousness, the Security Council intends to respond with sanctions in case of no effective implementation till the end of the current mandate.⁴⁶

With regards to Central Mali specifically, the Security Council urged authorities to take expedited action to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence and restore peaceful relations between communities. Furthermore, it urged to disarm without delay all militias; encourage the intensification of reconciliation initiatives with a view to prevent violence and promote peaceful co-existence amongst the communities.⁴⁷

In the latest resolution, the mandate authorized MINUSMA to use all necessary means to conduct its priority objectives and tasks, e.g.:⁴⁸


- 1) support the implementation of the Peace Agreement, in particular its main political and security provisions;
- 2) support the stabilization and restoration of state authority in Central Mali;

⁴⁵ United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (n.d.): *Mandate*. Available at: <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/mandate-0> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

- 
- 3) protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict;
 - 4) good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and local levels;
 - 5) assistance to the Malian authorities in their efforts to promote and protect human rights;
 - 6) contributing to the creation of a secure environment for the safe, civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance.


One of the most critical parts of the UN involvement in the Sahel region has been peacekeeping. In this issue-area, the cornerstone of all UN efforts has been MINUSMA. As of April 2021, the peacekeeping operation under the auspices of MINUSMA comprised 12,462 troops and 1,763 police personnel (the mandate allows for 15,209 uniformed personnel in total). Top contributing countries are Chad, Bangladesh and Burkina Faso for troops, and Senegal, Togo and Bangladesh for police personnel.⁴⁹

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

As previously mentioned, there are two main approaches in preventing terrorism and it is essential that both are employed hand in hand to complement each other. Whereas the first approach focuses on 'hard' security and short-term solutions to 'symptoms' of terrorism, the second approach emphasizes long-term solutions aimed at 'causes'. As the topic of this guide is the prevention, it will focus on the latter approach.

The core aspects of all UN prevention efforts are UNOWAS and the UNSP, which have been rather extensively described in the Discussion of the Problem section. Therefore, the international community should focus on several key and priority areas:


⁴⁹ United Nations Peacekeeping (2021): *MINUSMA FACT SHEET*. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).

- 
- 1) Governance;
 - 2) Resilience;
 - 3) Security - cross-border cooperation, prevention and sustaining peace;
 - 4) Economic revitalization and inclusive growth;
 - 5) Climate action;
 - 6) Renewable energy;
 - 7) Women and youth empowerment.

It is important to note that the listed areas are to various extent intertwined, influencing each other or even being interdependent. Therefore, issue-areas mentioned below should not be approached as isolated tasks, but only as a part of complex, all-encompassing efforts, where ensuring hand-in-hand complementary progress is of critical importance. Moreover, it is important to emphasize, that the below mentioned issue-areas and measures serve merely as an inspiration / guidance and are not a compulsory policy direction.

Governance

Strong and competent local, regional and state authorities and institutions are one of key aspects of successful prevention of terrorism. Enhancement of governance and ensuring availability of social and health services and protection of basic rights and rule of law greatly limit recruitment options for terrorist organizations; thus, their ability to conduct operations or re-emerge. The international community should focus on concrete solutions for promoting development of information systems, risk-informed decision-making, crisis-response



capabilities (e.g. natural disasters), effective implementation of strategies and policies (e.g. Stabilization Strategy and Programme), access to justice and human rights, or combating corruption.⁵⁰

Resilience

Improving resilience encompasses adopting measures to prevent a return to vicious circle of deterioration and destabilization. Therefore, international community could support specific measures in areas of conflict and violence prevention, response to security threats and extremism, education, social cohesion (also between cross-border communities), institution-building, monitoring of risks and combating terrorist propaganda / disinformation.⁵¹


Security

Within the security dimension of preventing terrorism, it is essential to focus on cross-border cooperation between states and on efforts protecting and sustaining peace. In prevention efforts, the security measures should not prefer high-intensity short operations – those should be conducted in fight against active terrorism. On the contrary, *preventive* security efforts should be lower-intensity, long-term and flexible to respond to emerging threats.

Therefore, the international community ought to focus its attention on proposing concrete steps in intelligence (early warning – early response), low-tech attacks, protection of critical infrastructure, prevention of terrorist actions of individuals, prevention of lasting

⁵⁰ United Nations (2018): *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working Together for a Prosperous and Peaceful Sahel*. Available at: https://www.un.org/africarenewal/sites/www.un.org.africarenewal/files/English%20Summary%20Report_0.pdf (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).

⁵¹ Ibid.



traumatization (from previous attacks), prevention of public panic and human rights violations, and strengthening monitoring of international humanitarian law compliance.⁵²

Economic revitalization and inclusive growth

Social-economic conditions and prospects of future are regarded as one of the essential aspects of successful and effective prevention of terrorism. In addition, the growth needs to be inclusive, as with only specific groups benefiting, social tensions emerge; therefore, creating a space for terrorist propaganda and activities.

The international community should devote considerable attention to issue-areas of decent jobs and sustainable livelihoods (through training, technological innovation, skills and entrepreneurship development), universal health coverage, systems of social protection and redistribution, equal access to at least primary education as a bare minimum, with special emphasis on **youth** on all listed issue-areas.⁵³

Climate action

As previously briefly introduced, the climate change plays a significant (and growing) role in the Sahel region. Areas of international focus in this dimension of preventing terrorism should

⁵² International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) (2021): *Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness*. Available at: <https://icct.nl/handbook-of-terrorism-prevention-and-preparedness/> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).

⁵³ United Nations (2018): *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working Together for a Prosperous and Peaceful Sahel*. Available at: https://www.un.org/africarenewal/sites/www.un.org.africarenewal/files/English%20Summary%20Report_0.pdf (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).



include ensuring food security, rural development (e.g. resilience), water security and support for communities.⁵⁴

Renewable energy


Access to affordable, clean and available energy is a necessary prerequisite for social-economic development. In order to prevent resurgence of terrorism, ensuring stable and sustainable energy to the population and businesses is of critical importance. International community should place emphasis on areas such as grid infrastructure, improvement of energy mix, resilience of energy grids to both natural and security threats, investment, and facility maintenance.⁵⁵

Women and youth empowerment

Women and youth are the most vulnerable among the population. Therefore, it is essential to guarantee their security and empower them to resist the terrorist propaganda. As mentioned above, one of the most important aspect is the prospect of future – by attaining their potential, women and youth could play the role of custodians of peace and development. Concrete steps include participation in leadership positions, engagement on all levels of public, economic and political life, access to ownership and control of property etc.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.



Nevertheless, as emphasized above, all prevention efforts have to be complemented by short-term 'hard' security efforts (e.g. through MINUSMA).


BLOC POSITIONS

The P5

The permanent members of the Security Council represent various foreign policy traditions and interests. The most regionally active P5 member is **France**, a former colonial overlord, which has a rather extensive military presence in the region. However, France has recently announced a shift to a specialized regional force, which will involve a downsizing of its overall strength.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, the region remains of crucial French political, economic and security interests, therefore, the downsizing should be seen as a change in strategy/tactics rather than withdrawal. The region is also of significant interest of the **United States**, as the Sahel serves as a safe haven and training site for global terrorist networks. Similar perspective would assume also the **United Kingdom**.

On the other hand, **Russia** and **China** might attempt to limit Western military presence on the grounds of neo-colonialism. However, especially China has extensive economic interests in Africa as well as interest in secure maritime shipping lines along the Gulf of Guinea. Overall, the region is of security interest (e.g. *global* terrorism) to every member of the P5.

⁵⁶ Associated Press (AP) (2021): *France to pull more than 2,000 troops from Africa's Sahel*. Available at: <https://apnews.com/article/europe-government-and-politics-france-e384891a63e6ac15c02177b2c095bf26> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).



Other members


The other members of the Council represent various aims. However, they consist mainly of the developing (Third) world, which has implications on their respective foreign policies. **Niger** is a member of the G5 Sahel and suffers greatly from the terrorist activity. Thus, Niger should opt for significant international aid in all forms – humanitarian, military, financial, technical, etc. On the other hand, Niger, as a former colony, would oppose extensive military presence of Western powers in the region. Given the severity of the situation, Niger might prefer emphasis on shorter-term oriented solutions (e.g. intelligence - early-warning / early-response) and setting up basis for long-term approach. Similar position might be assumed by **Tunisia** and **Kenya** due to their geographical proximity.

Members of the EU (Estonia, Ireland) would also opt for effective solutions, as the situation has direct implication on the bloc (e.g. migration). However, the EU member states should prefer non-military means and tools, together with emphasis on human rights and humanitarian situation. With their extensive experience in humanitarian aid and development assistance, the EU member states might provide longer-term solutions. It is also essential to distinguish between independent foreign policy of member states and common policy of the EU (which affect each other). Similar strategy could be also pursued by **Norway**.

India, Mexico, Vietnam and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines would possibly stress the multilateral approach through United Nations system (e.g. peacekeeping, humanitarian aid) due to colonial experience, fears of neo-colonialism in Africa and their foreign policy tradition.



POINTS A RESOLUTION SHOULD ADDRESS

- 1) Given the vast scope of UN involvement, where should the international community place an emphasis, what should be a priority in terrorism prevention efforts?
 - 2) Given the long-term nature of prevention, how could United Nations alleviate the current suffering of civilians?
 - 3) Given the diversity of the international community, how could developed and developing nations work together to break the vicious circle without creating dependencies?
 - 4) How could the United Nations address the subsidiarity principle and strengthen involvement of regional / local actors (bottom-up approach)?
 - 5) What is your country's foreign policy style? Does it prefer 'hard power' solutions or is it more focused on 'soft power' approach?
 - 6) Does your country have presence in the region (political, economic, military, etc.)? Do you contribute to the UN Peacekeeping troops under MINUSMA?
- 



RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS

[Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Resulting from the Algiers Process \(2015\)](#)

- between Malian authorities and armed groups;
- promise of genuine national reconciliation;
- focus on the 2011-2012 separatist rebellion;
- fails to address subsequent issues, such as Islamist violence, lethal ethnic tensions, and persistent insecurity.⁵⁷

Security Council resolution [S/RES/2085 \(2012\)](#)

- authorized AFISMA
- established UNOM

Security Council resolution [S/RES/2100 \(2013\)](#)

Security Council resolution [S/RES/2359 \(2017\)](#)

- welcomed the deployment of the G5 Sahel force.

Security Council resolution [S/RES/2391 \(2017\)](#)

- MINUSMA support to the CBJF.

Security Council resolution [S/RES/2480 \(2019\)](#)

- renewal of MINUSMA mandate until 30 June 2020;
- establishment of a second strategic priority - MINUSMA support to government efforts to stabilise central Mali;
- expansion of the provision of MINUSMA life support consumables to all contingents in the CBJF.

Security Council Resolution [S/RES/2531 \(2020\)](#)

- renewal of MINUSMA mandate until 30 June 2021
- urge to Malian authorities to fulfill their commitments


UN Secretary-General's report [S/2021/442](#) on CBJF

⁵⁷ Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2020): *Why Mali needs a new peace deal*. Available at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-mali-needs-new-peace-deal> (Last Access: August 3rd, 2021).



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
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